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1. INTRODUCTION
Self-sovereign identity (SSI) encapsulates a set of technologies, tools, and governance models
designed to outline and facilitate the transition to a new paradigm for digital identity systems. One
where individuals, organisations, and things are able to actively participate as peers in the digital
relationships they establish and maintain over time. The evolving ideology around this movement,
initially articulated as 10 principles (Allen, 2016), focuses on empowering the individual, providing
them with an independent digital existence that is usable and useful across contexts.
The technical architecture that is emerging defines three distinct transactional roles that entities
within an SSI system can engage in; issuer, verifier, and holder. An issuer signs a set of attributes they
are attesting to about an entity then presents a data object containing this signature and attributes,
a credential, to the entity in the role of holder for this interaction. A holder can then present these
attributes along with a cryptographic proof to any number of entities in future interactions. The
entity receiving this proof and verifying its integrity is defined as the verifier for that interaction
(Sporny et al., 2019a).
To support this architecture a number of open standards are under development. The most
mature is the Verifiable Credential Data Model, a W3C recommended standard for the structure
of the credential data object that issuers sign (Sporny et al., 2019a). Decentralised Identifiers
(DIDs) are another key specification currently going through standardisation in the W3C DID
Working Group. This specification defines a new type of identifier designed to facilitate this
verifiable, decentralised architecture for digital identity (Reed et al., 2020). DIDs enable entities
to provision and manage their own identifiers using a decentralised system and public key
cryptography rather than external parties (Allen et al., 2015). These identifiers must be resolvable
to a DID Document which contains public keys and authentication mechanisms that support the
cryptographic verification of signatures made by the entity in control of the associated private keys.
TheW3CDID specification is designed to be technology and protocol agnostic, instead defining
a common syntax that can be used to understand all DIDs and a generic set of requirements for
create, read, update, and deactivate operations of DIDDocuments (Reed et al., 2020). Implementers
of DID methods select an infrastructure they trust to store these identifiers and their related
documents. A distributed ledger, as an append only, immutable, highly available decentralised data
storage system is ideal for this infrastructure (Allen et al., 2015; Evans-Greenwood et al., 2016).
This paper focuses on a specific type of distributed ledger designed to support this technical
architecture, Hyperledger Indy. The data contained within this ledger are analysed from the
perspective of a verifier attempting to assess the risk associated with accepting a credential
presentation they have received.
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2. METHOD
Hyperledger Indy is an open source code base for the
instantiation of a ledger to support the creation of public
identifiers, DIDs, able to issue and revoke cryptographic
credentials using an RSA based scheme first published by
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (2001, 2002). Anyone with read
access to the ledger can verify signatures made by issuers on
credentials, or their presentations. As Indy has been designed
solely for the purpose of identity management and supports
anonymous credential cryptography, it stores unique data in
contrast to other ledgers that store decentralised identifiers, such
as the Bitcoin or Veres One ledgers (Allen et al., 2019; Sporny
et al., 2019b). These data are written to the ledger in a number of
different transaction types. These are:
• NYM—These transactions write a new DID and related DID
Document to the ledger.
• ATTRIB—Transactions that update existing DID Documents
on the ledger, such as rotating keys or changing service
endpoints. These must be authored and signed by the DID that
identifies the DID Document being updated.
• SCHEMA—These transactions define a schema name,
version, and list of attribute names for a specific credential.
The schema name must be unique on the ledger, but can be
altered by writing a schema with the same name and different
version number. Versioning a schema must be done by the
original author of the schema transaction.
• CLAIM_DEF—Often referred to as a credential definition,
these transactions write the public key from a generated
key pair of an CL-RSA signature for a specific credential
schema (Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, 2002). Only DIDs with
CLAIM_DEF transactions for specific schema included in the
ledger can issue credentials of this schema that are publicly
verifiable. Many DIDs can author CLAIM_DEF transactions
referencing the same schema.
• REVOC_REG_DEF—Transactions that define a revocation
registry for a certain credential definition transaction (CL-RSA
public key) meaning that credentials signed by this public key
can be revoked. Currently, these registries use cryptographic
accumulators defined in a 2009 paper by Camenisch et al.
(2009).
• REVOC_REG_ENTRY—Whenever an issuer issues or
revokes a credential, they must author a transaction that
updates the revocation registry keeping them up to date
so they can be used to construct and verify proofs of
non-revocation.
Only NYM and ATTRIB transactions are analogous to other
ledgers storing and maintaining DIDs. The reason Indy ledgers
include SCHEMA and CLAIM_DEF transactions is likely
determined by the need to efficiently support CL-RSA signatures.
They have public keys that grow linearly in size with the number
of attributes being signed and can take seconds to generate
(Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, 2002; Pointcheval and Sanders,
2016). This is too long to be generated at verification time
from a single key, hence they are pre-generated by issuers who
specify the number of messages to be signed by identifying the
schema they intend to issue. This is then stored on the ledger
improving verification efficiency. The revocation transactions
are similarly unique to Indy ledgers, to our knowledge the
only ledger attempting to support anonymous revocation of
credentials. These design choices, heavily influenced by the
cryptographic primitives the ledger supports, present a richer
source of transaction data than other ledgers used to support
SSI interactions. As new, more efficient cryptographic protocols,
such as BBS+ are supported by Indy, it is expected that the
design choices of these ledger will not be so dependent on these
protocols (Camenisch et al., 2016).
All transactions include the time they were authored and a
unique identifier that can be used to reference and resolve data
from within them. Transactions must be signed by the public key
associated with a DID already stored on the ledger before it is
accepted by the nodes maintaining the ledger state. This leads to
a hierarchical structure whereby all DIDs must first be authored
to the ledger in a nym transaction signed by the key of another
DID before they can themselves write transactions to the ledger.
Any Indy-based ledger is initiated with a number of genesis nym
transactions and all other nym transactions can be traced to a
nym transaction signed by one of these DIDs. This structure
of signed transactions allows any entity to verify the validity
of the ledger state by starting from these genesis transactions.
It also ensures rules around which DID has the authority to
update a DID Document, schema, or revocation registry can be
cryptographically enforced.
The dataset under analysis in this paper are the transactions
from a specific instantiation of an Indy based distributed ledger,
the Sovrin MainNet. A ledger that has been running since
July 2017 that supports some of the most mature deployments
SSI systems today. The ledger includes 448 nym transactions,
including 16 genesis nyms representing the Sovrin board of
trustees, 88 schema, and 356 credential definitions. While other
Indy ledgers include far more transactions, such as the Sovrin
StagingNet with almost 20,000 nym transactions, the Sovrin
MainNet is for production deployments of SSI so provides a
more realistic dataset. Despite this focus on the MainNet, the
analysis should be at least partially applicable to any Indy-based
distributed ledger.
A major difference between the Sovrin MainNet and other
Indy networks is that it is a public-permissioned network
governed by the Sovrin Governance Framework that defines
the roles and responsibilities of different actors within the
network (Sovrin Governance, 2019a). A permissioned network
adds additional constraints around who can write to the ledger.
In the Sovrin MainNet only DIDs with the role of transaction
endorser are able to write nym transactions to the ledger and all
subsequent transactions these DIDs author must be additionally
signed by a transaction endorser (Sovrin Governance, 2019c).
This presents interesting opportunities for analysis as we discuss
later in the paper.
The nodes within the Sovrin MainNet are run by Sovrin
Stewards, organisations that volunteer time and resources to
maintain the network. The network is administered andmanaged
by the Sovrin Foundation which also acts as a Governance
Authority (Sovrin Governance, 2019a). Stewards are selected
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by the Governance Authority to ensure maximal distribution
of hardware, domain, and geographic location limiting the
threat vector of malicious takeover and promoting resilience. All
stewards agree to the requirements specified by the Governance
Framework and sign the Sovrin Stewards Agreement (Sovrin
Governance, 2019a,b). Nodes accepted into the network then
engage in a consensus protocol named plenum based on
redundant byzantine fault tolerance (Aublin et al., 2013). As such,
assuming the Sovrin Foundation and a subset of the stewards can
be trusted then the transactions stored within the ledger can be
trusted with a high degree of confidence.
The data discussed within this paper can be accessed through
the public hyperledger indy transaction explorer, IndyScan. For
more detailed analysis, it is also possible to clone the github
repository for this explorer and visualise the data from the
ledger through a Kibana dashboard or similar. Alternatively,
the ledger data can be fetched using indy-vdr a hyperledger
repository designed for querying indy nodes. This paper uses
visualisations of a subset of MainNet transactions retrieved using
the IndyScan API.
3. ANALYSIS
Analysis of the data held within a Hyperledger Indy network
may be useful for answering questions from many different
perspectives within an SSI system. This paper focuses on one in
detail, that of a verifier attempting to determine whether to accept
a proof of a set of attributes presented by a credential holder.
While this decision will be tied to the semantic context of the
interaction and is largely subjective for each verifier, we focus
our analysis specifically on the syntax, the information contained
within the ledger that might influence the decision of a verifier.
Either alerting them to increased risk, or giving them a greater
degree of assurance.
The presentation of indy-backed credentials is specified by
Aries-rfc-0037 (Khateev, 2019), a protocol involving two entities,
a holder and a verifier, that have previously exchanged peer
DIDs to establish a DIDComm channel across which encrypted,
digitally signed messages can be exchanged, authenticated, and
decrypted. The holder then constructs a proof object from a set
of credentials that have previously been issued to them and sends
this to the verifier. From this proof, the verifier is able to learn:
• The attribute values presented
• The identifiers of the scheme the attributes were issued in
• The identifiers of a set of claim definitions
• The mathematical proof of the integrity of the attributes
• The mathematical proof of a common master secret attribute
known to the holder and signed by the issuer of each credential
involved in the presentation
• The identifiers for the revocation registries of credentials
if applicable
The verifier can then query the ledger for the CLAIM_DEF
transactions to return the public keys of the issuers of each of the
credentials used to construct the proof. Using these keys the proof
object can be mathematically verified such that the verifier can
have high confidence that the attributes presented were issued
to the same master secret, the holder knows this secret and the
attributes presented have not been tampered with since issuance.
Additionally, resolving the REVOC_REG_DEF transactions
allows for verification of any proof of non-revocation, if this has
been included in the presentation. However, in addition to the
fidelity of the information contained within the presentation, a
verifier must assess its provenance (Windely, 2020).
This paper suggests Indy transaction data can provide insights
into the question of provenance by using the SCHEMA and
CLAIM_DEF transaction identifiers as a starting point for
inquiry. By querying the ledger dataset for these transactions, the
verifier learns the DIDs of the transaction author and transaction
endorser for both transactions. Depending on the context,
different comparisons may be appropriate here. A verifier may
expect both of these transactions to have been endorsed by the
same DID. In the future, this may present a mechanism to
associate a presentation with a specific governance domain that
the credentials were issued under, where the endorser represents
a governance authority. In contrast, when comparing the DID
that authored the SCHEMA with that of the CLAIM_DEF, a
difference here might give the verifier greater assurance.
Another potentially useful insight can be gained from the
ledger by querying all CLAIM_DEF transactions that reference
the schema used within the presentation. See the dotted lines
between blue nodes (SCHEMA) and green nodes (CLAIM_DEF)
in Figures 1, 2. Through this, the verifier learns how many
distinct issuers are able to issue this credential, giving some
indication of its value and adoption. This analysis can be
extended further by including the transaction endorsers of
these CLAIM_DEF transactions and, further still, to include the
endorser of the NYM transactions for the DIDs that authored
these CLAIM_DEFs. A visualisation of this analysis can be seen
in Figure 2.
This approach effectively graphs the roots of trust associated
with a particular credential schema. In this instance, a single
endorser used for all transactions might indicate a strong
governance domain, particularly where there are many issuers
involved. The analysis of these patterns can be derived from the
SCHEMA transaction identifier, information that is included in
a presentation request so available to all verifiers. Additionally,
by placing the CLAIM_DEF and NYM transactions of the issuer
within this pattern it may be possible to spot anomalies alerting
them of potentially untrustworthy issuers. For example, if these
transactions had been endorsed by a different DID in a schema
pattern that has a common endorser for all other transactions.
Such patterns can clearly be seen within the Sovrin MainNet, as
the visualisations in Figures 1, 2 show.
Querying the ledger for information about a DID could be
worthwhile for certain verifiers as it would enable them to see all
the transactions they have authored over time. The importance
of the author of the NYM transaction that initially wrote this
DID to the ledger has already been emphasised, however, other
information may be equally useful. For example, how long ago
the NYM transaction was authored, how many CLAIM_DEF
transactions they have written to the ledger, and which credential
schema are they for.
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FIGURE 1 | Visualisation of authored transactions linked to a single schema identifier.
FIGURE 2 | Visualisation of transaction endorsement for the same transactions shown in Figure 1.
The analysis presented has focused only on the ledger data,
following a logical pathway of inquiry a verifier might take
when presented with a proof object from an entity containing
SCHEMA and CLAIM_DEF transaction identifiers. It has been
described to illustrate what it is possible to learn from this data
independently of any contextual information that can be inferred
from the interaction or provided by the verifying entity itself.
This additional information may determine which questions are
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appropriate to ask from the data, as well as the acceptable answers
a verifier expects. An example of this might be the expectation
that issuers NYM and CLAIM_DEF transactions were endorsed
by a specific DID that is meaningful to the verifier.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper takes an indepth look at the data available within
Hyperledger Indy-based ledgers, focusing particularly on the
Sovrin MainNet, an established public ledger designed for
production use cases. This specific instantiation has well-defined
governance processes and legally binding agreements for all
actors within the network. Assuming trust is placed in these
processes then the information within the ledger can be trusted
to a high degree of assurance. In the future, it is expected that
many more public networks based on Hyperledger Indy will
emerge for production use cases, as this happens the ability to
assess the trust placed in the specific ledger itself will become
increasingly important. This work is already underway within
the Sovrin community to define a set of common metrics with
which to evaluate different Indy nodes, ledgers, and networks
(Foundation, 2020; Indy, 2020).
For now though, it is important to recognise that the ledger
within an SSI network is designed to be a highly assured source
of information. Wherever there is data, there are insights that
can be drawn from this data. This paper puts forward an initial
attempt to describe exactly what these insights might be and
how they could be useful from the perspective of a verifier.
Within SSI, there are many perspectives that could adapt the
approaches described within this paper to answer their own
questions. Implications of this research could be built into the
governance framework’s assurance policies as well as verifiers’
business logic and user experience design. Equally, this suggests
that information from a public Indy ledger has potential privacy
and security implications for issuers. Further research is required
here, but it may be that for certain use cases and industries, this
is unacceptable.
We emphasise that this report is focused primarily on the
structure of the transaction data found within Indy ledgers and
the potential patterns that might emerge when these transactions
and their relationships are graphed. While the use case visualised
in Figures 1, 2 are of real transaction data on the Sovrin MainNet
from an advanced pilot within healthcare known to the authors,
it has been presented to illustrate the kinds of relationships and
patterns we think are useful to pay attention to. It is our hope
that this work stimulates further research into the patterns found
across a statistically meaningful sample of SSI applications, so
that reliable conclusions can be drawn.
In addition to this, there are many other DID methods
that resolve identifiers against other distributed ledgers, such as
Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Veres One. These are all permissionless
ledgers that support decentralised identity systems without
storing schema or credential definitions on the ledgers, a
quirk of Indy-based ledgers due to the anonymous credential
cryptography they support. This means that DIDs will not
be so directly correlated with the schema they can issue, or
schema with the DIDs that can issue them. Furthermore, since
anyone can write a DID to permissionless ledgers, different
mechanisms will need to be implemented to determine a
DIDs provenance. Finally, credential systems using non-Indy
ledgers often require holders to record DIDs on the ledger in
order to be able to authenticate as the credential subject to a
verifier. The advantages and disadvantages of these differences
and their implications for potential ledger analysis deserve
further attention.
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